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Do Political or Security Conditions Determine When American
Security Transfers Are Made?
Abstract
When terrorist attacks became more frequent and destructive in the early portion of the
twenty-first century, American officials asserted that Islamist networks needed to be
crippled. After a campaign against these groups was launched, Washington began to rely
on some new security measures. For the past two decades, several studies have been
produced about innovations such as drone strikes. What has not been seen, though, are
analyses of measures that the U.S. unveiled in the Cold War and has continued to use in the
effort against Islamist organizations. Within this article, America;s continued reliance on
transferal operations will be taken into consideration. While a military intervention is in
progress, policymakers declare that U.S. troops will be withdrawn from a country once
indigenous elements are capable of inheriting their responsibilities. However, a security
transfer usually takes place when the intervention becomes unpopular on the American
home front.
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Introduction
Since becoming the most powerful capitalist nation at the conclusion of
the Second World War, the United States has conducted several military
campaigns in developing nations. When policymakers in Washington have
recognized that certain operations are not generating desirable results,
they have implemented new strategies to salvage them. While inspecting
various missions from the post-World War II era in a superficial fashion, it
becomes apparent that the favored strategy of U.S. officials is the
transferal policy or having indigenous elements in a particular nation
assume the peacekeeping responsibilities of U.S. soldiers. Once
policymakers embrace this policy, they must select the point at which an
army or police force will inherit the tasks that U.S. troops are performing.
The remarks of George W. Bush lead one to believe that the security
conditions in the target country determine when the United States makes
a transfer. During a speech about an operation in Iraq, he said, “As the
Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”1
The closer an individual looks at prior initiatives, the more he or she is
likely to realize that the political situation in the United States actually
determines when an army or police force inherits the responsibilities of
U.S. soldiers. Thorough examinations of the U.S. interventions in Korea
and Vietnam in the upcoming pages will enable the reader to see the
manner in which U.S. presidents have a propensity to complete transfers
when military interventions start to become unpopular on the home front.
The operation on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s will commence in the
next section.

U.S. Involvement in the Korean War
In order to develop a solid understanding of the transfer in Korea, it is
imperative to discuss some of the developments that preceded it. Within
Proxy Wars, Eli Berman and David Lake note how a major power has two
options for neutralizing an external threat. When the leaders of the
country do not want to place troops in harm’s way or spend a considerable
amount of money, they can rely upon indirect action. In other words, they
can ask another state to take the necessary steps to eliminate the security
threat. There is the possibility that an ally will not have soldiers that are
capable of weakening an enemy for an extended period. If this deficiency is
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present, the major power will need to resort to direct action by having its
own soldiers cripple the foe.2
At the end of the Second World War, the United States appeared to be a
power that would just use direct action in the ideological struggle with the
Soviet Union. In the middle of the 1940s, there were anti-communist
actors in Japan and Germany that would have provided assistance in the
fight against the USSR. However, policymakers in Washington decided to
place combat troops within these nations in the midst of reconstruction.
By the end of the 1940s, there were events that indicated the United States
was amenable to having others take the lead in the battle against
international communism. The most important event in relation to this
discussion is the manner in which Harry Truman, the thirty-third U.S.
president, had approximately five hundred troops assists the South Korean
government with the development of its military.3
Officials in Seoul and Washington had different perspectives about the
future use of this military. In the aftermath of the Second World War, a
communist regime came to power in North Korea. It did not take long for
Moscow to start providing the North Koreans with tanks and other
equipment to construct a formidable military. Because this military
buildup was occurring above the thirty-eighth parallel (the boundary that
separated the two Koreas), U.S. officials believed that the members of the
incipient South Korean military would be used to thwart acts of
aggression. Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, did not envision
using military personnel to repel North Korean attacks. Instead, he
anticipated utilizing them to prevent his political rivals from removing him
from office.4
During the summer of 1950, Rhee’s political foes did not organize a coup
d’état, but North Korea did launch a full-scale invasion. On June 25, 1950,
North Korean soldiers began to move across the thirty-eighth parallel at
various points. As they met members of the South Korean army, they did
not encounter much resistance since South Korean soldiers fled from their
assigned defensive positions. Just one week into the war, the hierarchy of
the South Korean military could not account for 44,000 of the troops that
had received training from the United States.5 Since the South Korean
desertion rate was so high, North Korean forces took control of key
locations such as Seoul without much difficulty.6
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Inside A General’s Life: An Autobiography, Omar Bradley, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Truman, says that U.S. officials typically
give the military commander in a theater of operations the autonomy to
decide how acts of aggression should be handled.7 At the time of the North
Korean invasion, Douglas MacArthur was the leader of U.S. forces in Asia.
On June 29, 1950, MacArthur traveled to the Korean Peninsula to
ascertain whether U.S. combat troops would have to fight against the
North Koreans. Shortly after his arrival, MacArthur concluded that the
United States needed to make the transition from indirect to direct action
because he frequently saw South Korean soldiers that were both “defeated
and dispersed.”8 He quickly sent a cable to Washington that requested the
deployment of the U.S. 24th Division. In addition to granting this troop
request, Truman named his subordinate the leader of all United Nations
forces in Korea.9
From the information at the end of the preceding paragraph, one can
gather that the United Nations supported the military campaign on the
Korean Peninsula. This international institution elected to back the
operation, but the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate did not pass a
resolution sanctioning military action in Asia, making the Korean conflict
the first major U.S. war without Congressional authorization. Something
else, which separates the Korean conflict from preceding wars, is its
outcome. In the Mexican-American War, Spanish-American War, World
War I, and World War II, U.S. forces managed to secure convincing
triumphs against their adversaries. The U.S. troops in Korea, on the other
hand, had to settle for a stalemate against their communist opponents. As
early as the summer of 1950, there were signs that the United States would
be unable to replicate the success it had experienced in prior conflicts.
When troops from the 24th Division arrived in South Korea, they
consistently lost to North Korean forces on the battlefield. This
disappointing turn of events forced officials to accelerate the U.S. troop
buildup below the thirty-eighth parallel.10
Once the U.S. reinforcements arrived, there were indications that the
North Koreans were beginning to lose their momentum. Although the
North Koreans acquired several strategic positions in their initial advance,
they were cognizant of the fact that more would need to be seized if they
were going to be victorious, especially the Taegu-Masan-Pusan-Kyongju
80
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rail connection that was allowing the UN to transport supplies and
personnel throughout South Korea. For six weeks, the North Koreans
attempted to gain control of this rail connection. However, they were
unable to do so because the members of the U.S. Eighth Army thwarted all
of their offensives.11 When the U.S. reinforcements were not preventing
the North Koreans from taking territory, they were liberating South
Korean cities and towns. While the Second World War was in progress,
MacArthur saw his troops perform successful amphibious landings across
the Pacific Ocean. At one point on his tour of the Korean Peninsula in late
June, he concluded that it would be advantageous to conduct another
amphibious landing in Inchon, a port city near Seoul. Truman and others
in Washington did not share MacArthur’s enthusiasm for this plan, but
they eventually told him he could execute it. On September 15, 1950,
personnel from the U.S. Seventh Division and First Marine Division did
not come under heavy fire from North Korean troops, so they managed to
move inward at a rapid pace and retake Inchon without much difficulty.12
Because MacArthur disregarded presidential directives on more than one
occasion, Truman believed he was similar to George McClellan, the Union
General who had trouble following Abraham Lincoln’s orders during the
U.S. Civil War.13 What the thirty-third U.S. president failed to realize was
that these famous generals had more in common than a propensity to be
insubordinate. In the fall of 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia was
experiencing a considerable amount of casualties in the Battle of Antietam.
Aware of the serious position he was in, Robert E. Lee, the commander of
the Army of Northern Virginia, instructed the remainder of his soldiers to
return to their home state. If he told his forces to pursue these retreating
troops, McClellan probably would have been able to eliminate the rest of
the Army of Northern Virginia, but he refrained from ordering such a
maneuver. As American soldiers liberated South Korean cities and towns
in September 1950, North Korean officials instructed their troops to move
above the thirty-eight parallel. Like McClellan, MacArthur did not instruct
the soldiers under his command to pursue those who were in retreat, so
over 90,000 North Korean soldiers managed to find refuge in their native
country.14
The preservation of the North Korean army made it more difficult for the
United States to unify the Korean Peninsula under the rule of Syngman
Rhee. However, it was not as impactful as another development that took
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place later in 1950. On October 2, 1950, Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Foreign
Minister, met with Kavalam Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, in
Beijing. While this meeting was in progress, En-Lai informed Panikkar
that the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by U.S. led forces would
prompt his nation to enter the Korean conflict.15 This warning, coupled
with intelligence reports of a Chinese troop buildup in Manchuria, a
province on the border of North Korea, should have resulted in
policymakers in Washington electing to keep soldiers out of North Korean
territory, but they allowed MacArthur to send the Eighth Army and other
U.S. units above the thirty-eighth parallel. During the initial stages of the
campaign in North Korea, U.S. troops managed to seize some cities and
towns, including the capital of Pyongyang. Once Chinese troops began to
arrive in North Korea, though, they seldom had opportunities to take
control of locations of strategic value. Instead, they spent the majority of
their time fleeing from Pyongyang and other seized land since the Chinese
attacks were so overwhelming. By the end of 1950, every portion of North
Korea was back in communist hands and U.S. soldiers were below the
thirty-eighth parallel once again.
Over the years, analysts have focused on the differences that were present
between capitalist and communist nations during the Cold War.
Consequently, they have rarely acknowledged the manner in which these
rivals also shared some important similarities. At the beginning of 1951, it
would have been prudent for officials in Beijing to refrain from launching
a full-scale offensive in a hostile nation. However, like U.S. policymakers
in October 1950, they decided to have the soldiers under their command
conduct an invasion. Just one month into the Chinese campaign in South
Korea, there were indications that it was not going to generate a desirable
outcome. On February 10, 1951, X Corps, a U.S. division commanded by
Edward Almond, MacArthur’s protégé, pushed Chinese forces out of
Wonju. During the following month, the Eighth Army was able to regain
control of the South Korean capital.16
In the second year of the conflict, there was a major change in the fighting
on the Korean Peninsula. Following the North Korean invasion in June
1950, the majority of the battles that took place were reminiscent of the
ones, which transpired during the Second World War. That is, they
involved troops making territorial gains through the utilization of
conventional tactics. During the summer of 1951, the engagements started
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to remind observers of the battles that occurred in the First World War.
Soldiers were still fighting against each other in a conventional fashion,
but they seldom seized control of strategic locations.17 This evolution
helped convince the members of the Truman administration that they
needed to abandon the goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under Rhee
and concentrate on protecting the territorial integrity of South Korea.
Not only did the figures from the Truman administration adopt a new
objective, they developed another strategy for dealing with the conflict in
Asia. Since South Korean soldiers were humiliated in the first month of the
war, Truman had U.S. combat troops lead the effort against the North
Koreans. Although South Korean troops were still performing poorly on
the battlefield in 1951, there were signs that Truman wanted to hand the
responsibility of leading the military campaign to them. If inefficient
soldiers from an allied country are going to inherit a military campaign at
a future date, they will need to receive additional training from troops that
have experienced success in previous engagements. Aware of this need for
more training, Truman started to increase the number of U.S. advisors in
South Korea in 1951. By the month of September, 1308 trainers were
below the thirty-eighth parallel to work with the members of the South
Korean military.18
A U.S. president who turns to the transferal policy anticipates that the
withdrawal of combat troops will eventually follow the addition of
advisors. When a troop withdrawal does take place, it is inevitable that the
commander-in-chief will claim that the soldiers are being removed
because the army or police force in a particular country has improved
considerably. However, there is a chance that he is making the move
because he believes it will be helpful to him or his political allies on the
home front. In such a situation, how can a U.S. citizen ascertain whether
security enhancements abroad or political conditions at home are
precipitating the drawdown? If the members of an army or police force
maintain or seize territory in several battles against an opponent before
the withdrawal, it will be possible for the American to conclude that the
security conditions have improved in the target state. On the other hand, if
a president is dealing with a war-weary Congress, running for re-election,
or attempting to get a member of his party into the White House and
military triumphs are rare, it will be appropriate for the citizen to presume
that political considerations are influencing the drawdown.
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Under Truman, multiple U.S. divisions were withdrawn from South
Korea.19 While looking at the performances of South Korean troops in the
time leading up to these withdrawals, it becomes apparent that they did
not experience impressive victories against their communist opponents.
Since the South Koreans were still struggling on the battlefield, one must
turn to the developments inside the United States to explain the
withdrawals that took place during the Truman presidency. As U.S.
citizens learned about the lack of progress on the Korean Peninsula, their
support for the war effort began to decline. Not only did these individuals
become disillusioned with the military conflict, they started to lose
confidence in the politician who was leading it. By December 1951, Harry
Truman’s approval rating had plummeted to 23 percent.20 With the
majority of the electorate opposed to him, Truman did not have the desire
to seek another term in office the following year, but he was determined to
see his party maintain control of the executive branch. In fact, when he
was talking about Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee he
encouraged to run, in front of one audience, he said, “I am going to take
my coat off and do everything I can to help him win.”21There is a chance
the preceding material will not be enough to convince some readers that
Truman’s troop withdrawals in 1952 were politically motivated. However,
as they read about the U.S. experience in Vietnam in the next section,
these skeptics will probably begin to think that a sitting president is
capable of behaving in such an unappealing fashion.

U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War
The initial portion of the U.S. intervention in South Vietnam was similar to
the early part of the mission in Korea since it also entailed the use of
indirect action. There are two important differences between these indirect
interventions, though. In Korea, only 500 U.S. advisors traveled to the
Korean Peninsula to assist South Korean soldiers. The indirect
intervention in South Vietnam commenced with approximately the same
amount of advisors. However, in 1961, the number of U.S. advisors helping
the South Vietnamese military rose to 17,000.22
The other major distinction between these campaigns is the manner in
which the U.S. trainers in South Korea and South Vietnam had different
goals for their trainees. At the beginning of the 1950s, U.S. officials
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believed that North Korea could launch an invasion of South Korea at any
time. Consequently, the advisors below the thirty-eighth parallel were
determined to turn the South Korean military into a force that was capable
of repelling an invasion. During the early 1960s, many in Washington
feared that a communist takeover in South Vietnam was on the horizon.
However, they did not think the North Vietnamese would attempt to
spread communism in the same fashion as the North Koreans. In other
words, they did not believe officials in Hanoi would have military
personnel invade South Vietnam since the North Vietnamese were already
providing guns, grenades, and other weaponry to the members of the
National Liberation Front, an insurgent group that was seeking to
overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem’s anti-communist regime. U.S. officials hoped
that the thousands of U.S. advisors below the seventeenth parallel (the
boundary separating North Vietnam and South Vietnam) would transform
the South Vietnamese military into an entity with the ability to quell the
communist insurgency.
The actions of the general population determine the length of a political
insurgency. If the majority of the people in a country continue to stand
behind the government, the insurgency will only last for a brief period. If
numerous citizens stop supporting those in power, though, the insurgency
will probably not end until a new political order is established. At the
beginning of the 1960s, the Diem regime started to lose a lot of support in
the South Vietnamese countryside. Consequently, it became possible for
the National Liberation Front to take control of several villages. The first
inclination of some in a counterinsurgency campaign is to respond to a
loss of territory as if they were soldiers in a conventional conflict. In other
words, they immediately presume that it would be advantageous to try to
regain the land by utilizing a considerable amount of coercion. However,
as one analyst has noted, such a reaction “is almost always entirely
counterproductive.”23 In order to regain seized villages and other
population centers, soldiers must enhance the living standards of citizens
by distributing supplies, repairing roads, and so forth. Diem responded to
the National Liberation Front’s territorial gains in a sagacious fashion by
having military personnel implement a series of measures to improve the
conditions in South Vietnamese villages.
The U.S. government financed some of Diem’s programs. The one, which
received the most U.S. funds, was his Strategic Hamlet Program. After it
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was unveiled in 1962, many peasants moved to villages that were not as
vulnerable to National Liberation Front penetration. Besides receiving
more protection, the peasants got a substantial amount of economic aid.
Although the Diem regime took these steps, the National Liberation Front
kept seizing villages in the countryside. This increase in strength prompted
multiple journalists in the fall of 1963 to conclude that Hanoi’s proxy was
on the verge of winning the war.24
U.S. officials possessed a more optimistic outlook about the conflict in
Southeast Asia towards the end of 1963. Prior to the introduction of the
Strategic Hamlet Program and other reforms, policymakers agreed with
the Diem regime about what it would take to defeat the communist
insurgency. In other words, they also believed that the best way to weaken
the National Liberation Front was by improving the living standards of the
South Vietnamese people. When this approach failed to bear any fruit,
U.S. leaders reached the conclusion that progress would only emerge on
this front in the struggle against communism if a new leader came to
power in Saigon. One can notice this evolution in U.S. thinking while
looking at some remarks from the individual who was serving as president
at the time. During a television interview, John F. Kennedy said South
Vietnam was in need of “changes in policy and perhaps…personnel.”25
Fortunately, for Kennedy and his advisors, there were figures in the South
Vietnamese military that were in the process of plotting Diem’s downfall.
On November 2, 1963, the followers of Tran Van Don, the acting Chief of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, successfully removed Diem from power. After
these rogue members of the military conducted the coup, the situation in
South Vietnam did not get any better. Under Diem, analysts only found
signs of deterioration outside of the government. In the post Diem era,
unwanted developments such as villages falling into the hands of the
National Liberation Front did continue, but there were also alarming
events within the corridors of power in Saigon, including five other
coups.26
Unprecedented developments also transpired in the U.S. government
following Diem’s ouster. While Diem was in office, U.S. policymakers
always focused on developing strategies that could enable the South
Vietnamese military to defeat the National Liberation Front. Once he was
gone, they began to claim that a favorable outcome would only emerge if
U.S. combat troops assumed control of the counterinsurgency effort from
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the South Vietnamese. In the summer of 1965, Lyndon Johnson, John F.
Kennedy’s successor, made the move from indirect to direct action by
sending 100,000 combat troops to South Vietnam. When the United
States resorted to direct action in Korea fifteen years earlier, it received the
support of the United Nations, but this international institution refused to
sanction the mission in Vietnam. Although the United Nations did not
support the campaign in Vietnam, it was backed by the body that refrained
from authorizing the operation in Korea. Before the combat troops arrived
in South Vietnam, both chambers in the U.S. Congress passed a resolution
that encouraged Johnson to “take all measures…to repulse aggression and
prevent further aggression.”27
The U.S. troops in South Vietnam encountered a war that was becoming
even more complicated. For years, North Vietnamese involvement in the
conflict below the seventeenth parallel was limited to providing military
assistance to the National Liberation Front. In 1964, though, officials in
Hanoi began to send combat troops to South Vietnam. By 1966, there were
approximately 50,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam.28
When Johnson made the decision to send combat troops to South
Vietnam, he presumed that they would just need to concentrate on
quelling the insurgency. However, once he learned about the size of the
North Vietnamese troop buildup, he became cognizant of the manner in
which these soldiers would also have to participate in conventional battles
on occasion.
The U.S. soldiers consistently experienced success as they carried out their
unexpected responsibility. When North Vietnamese troops launched
offensives to take control of government buildings or military bases, U.S.
forces usually managed to keep them from seizing their targets. Although
the Americans performed well in engagements against this conventional
foe, they failed to develop an effective strategy for dealing with the
unconventional one. In other words, they were unable to find an approach
for weakening the National Liberation Front. Of all the introduced
strategies, the one, which received the most use, was the search and
destroy mission. While a search and destroy mission was in progress,
soldiers were just supposed to eliminate National Liberation Front
operatives hiding in a village. However, there were times when they also
killed innocent civilians who were mistaken for National Liberation Front
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members. After individuals saw friends or relatives die in one of these
raids, they typically went on to join the National Liberation Front.29
The rise in National Liberation Front recruits and other negative
developments in the late 1960s forced William Westmoreland, the general
overseeing the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, to ask Johnson for 200,000
more combat troops. When Westmoreland had made troop requests in the
past, Johnson had always provided him with the amount of men he
wanted. However, on this occasion, the thirty-sixth U.S. president
refrained from sending additional soldiers to Southeast Asia. In order to
understand this unprecedented turn of events, one must take certain
developments inside the United States into consideration. At the start of
the U.S. escalation in the middle of the 1960s, eighty-five percent of the
U.S. citizenry was in favor of becoming more involved in the Vietnamese
conflict.30 By the latter portion of the decade, though, most Americans
wanted to see military personnel withdrawn from South Vietnam. Since
the war had become so unpopular, Johnson knew that news of a major
troop increase would upset citizens on the home front. He also recognized
he was in the same position that Harry Truman had been in at the
beginning of the 1950s. That is, he realized that if he ran for another term
in 1968 he would be defeated in a convincing fashion by his opponent.
Once Johnson announced that he would not run, he tried to help Hubert
Humphrey, his vice president, win the election. This provides another
connection between Johnson and Truman, but they attempted to help
their preferred candidates in different ways. In 1952, Truman decided to
pull some troops out of South Korea. Sixteen years later, Johnson opted to
halt the bombing campaign over North Vietnam shortly before U.S. voters
went to the polls.31
Although Humphrey received this assistance from Johnson, he still lost to
Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate. After Nixon assumed control of
the executive branch in January 1969, there were signs that he was
another proponent of the transferal policy. In multiple addresses, the new
commander-in-chief asserted that he planned to have South Vietnamese
soldiers take over the military campaign.32 As the South Vietnamese
became more proficient, it would be possible for him to withdraw U.S.
soldiers from Southeast Asia. What deserves attention at this point is the
manner in which Nixon was putting South Vietnamese soldiers in a far
more difficult position than the South Koreans were in when Truman
88
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turned to the transferal policy at the end of his presidency. South Korean
soldiers, as mentioned in the preceding section, just had to concentrate on
weakening a conventional enemy as U.S. troops departed. South
Vietnamese personnel, in contrast, would have to deal with both
conventional and unconventional foes.
There was an indication in the summer of 1969 that Nixon had begun to
implement his policy for the war. During the month of August, the new
president removed 25,000 American troops from South Vietnam.33 One
must remember that a troop withdrawal can only be attributed to better
security conditions if the reduction is preceded by indigenous forces
performing well on the battlefield. Prior to the withdrawal in August, the
members of the South Vietnamese military did not show much
improvement in battles against the North Vietnamese and the National
Liberation Front. In the middle of May, they became involved in a
memorable engagement with the former. At the beginning of the month,
the North Vietnamese were in control of Apbia Mountain. This mountain
near the Laotian border did not have any strategic value, but Creighton
Abrams, the new U.S. commander in Southeast Asia, still wanted to seize it
from the North Vietnamese. On May 10, 1969, he had U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces launch an assault against the North Vietnamese on
Apbia. Ten days into the campaign, troops from South Vietnam’s 2nd
Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and 1st Division retreated when the North
Vietnamese met their attempt to reach the top of Apbia with fierce
resistance.34 Shortly after this disappointing turn of events, the members
of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division managed to make it to the top of Apbia
with another offensive that forced North Vietnamese soldiers to abandon
their defensive positions.35
Because the South Vietnamese military did not become more proficient in
the time leading up to the August withdrawal, one must turn to the U.S.
home front to explain Nixon’s decision. Truman, as mentioned in the
discussion about the Korean War, believed troop withdrawals could help a
member of his party win the presidential election of 1952. When Nixon
came into the Oval Office in 1969, his long-term objective was not to make
it easier for another Republican to win the 1972 presidential race. Instead,
it was to ensure that he would not be a one-term president. As one
historian has noted, Nixon knew that if he did not decrease the amount of
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U.S. troops involved in the unpopular Vietnam conflict he would have “as
little prospect of being reelected as LBJ had in 1968.”36
For the rest of Nixon’s first term, other troop withdrawals took place in the
aftermath of disappointing performances by South Vietnamese troops.
However, if one inspects the subsequent years of Nixon’s only full term in
office, one comes across notable differences between the drawdowns in
1969 and the ones between 1970 and 1972. During the prior discussion
about the Battle for Mount Apbia, it was mentioned how South
Vietnamese soldiers fought alongside U.S. combat troops. From 1970 to
1972, members of the South Vietnamese military often participated in
engagements without this form of U.S. assistance. Ever since the start of
the conflict, Hanoi had used a road through Cambodia and Laos to deliver
supplies below the seventeenth parallel. In February 1971, South
Vietnamese soldiers invaded Laos to eliminate the northern portion of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. At the beginning of the offensive or Lam Son 719 as it
was called in Saigon, the South Vietnamese managed to seize control of
some towns inside Laotian territory, but they were eventually forced out of
these locations by members of the North Vietnamese military.37 In
addition to losing these pieces of land, the South Vietnamese military lost
a considerable amount of men. By the end of the forty-two day campaign,
the South Vietnamese only had half of their forces left.38
When the pilots of U.S. surveillance planes flew missions over Laos
following the offensive, they recognized that “truck-traffic on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail” had been “restored to its pre Lam Son 719 density.”39 Since the
South Vietnamese were unable to accomplish their main objective, Nixon
should have refrained from withdrawing more combat troops from
Southeast Asia in 1971, but he elected to do so. In fact, by the end of the
year, there was only one active American combat division left in South
Vietnam.40 To see how Nixon’s desire to be re-elected was still affecting
the decision-making in the White House during the latter stages of his first
term, it is necessary to take some comments just one month after the
conclusion of Lam Son 719 into consideration. At that time, his National
Security Adviser told him: “If we can, in October of ’72, go around the
country saying we ended the war and the Democrats wanted to turn it over
to the Communists…. Then we’re in great shape.”41 Something that sets
this policy-making apart from what was taking place in 1969 is the manner
in which the members of the Nixon foreign policy team now had to mollify
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legislators who were making it difficult to prosecute the war in an
aggressive fashion. Prior to the failed invasion in 1971, members of the
House of Representatives and Senate passed a measure that prohibited
U.S. combat troops from operating inside Laos and Cambodia.42 Following
it, they approved another act that prevented personnel from participating
in missions throughout all of Indochina.43

Conclusion
One of the most important tasks that presidents assume once they adopt
the transferal policy is determining when U.S. soldiers should be
withdrawn from different countries. In speeches and interviews, multiple
presidents have led U.S. citizens to believe that the capabilities of fledgling
security forces determine when reductions transpire. However, the
information in the preceding sections of this article indicates that the
political landscape in the United States prompts chief executives to order
drawdowns. While all presidents are concerned about what is happening
on the home front, it is important to keep in mind that they do not always
have the same political goals. Harry Truman reduced the number of troops
on the Korean Peninsula because he wanted to help another member of
the Democratic Party win the Presidential Election of 1952. Approximately
seventeen years after these drawdowns in Korea, Richard Nixon started to
withdraw soldiers from South Vietnam, but he took this step because he
wanted to be re-elected and placate members of the legislative branch.
The removal of troops gives presidents the opportunity to develop a more
favorable political landscape inside the United States. What one must
remember, though, is the manner in which drawdowns are likely to have
an adverse impact on the security conditions in a developing country. As
the members of a nascent army face an invading force or a contingent of
insurgents, they may lose more battles or even go so far as to surrender to
their enemies as many Iraqi soldiers did in the fighting against the Islamic
State in 2014. A U.S. president obviously does not want to see these
developments transpire abroad, so he should rely upon a policy that gives
him a better chance of killing two birds with one stone. In other words, he
should depend on a strategy that has the potential to allow him to deal
with political problems on the home front and maintain order in a target
nation. One option is to change the party that assumes the security
responsibilities of American soldiers. The Korean and Vietnam cases
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demonstrated that an American intervention could happen with or
without support from the United Nations. When this international body
sanctions a U.S. military mission, other countries usually deploy soldiers
to the nation where it is taking place. If future presidents only participate
in UN backed missions, there will be chances for them to use aid and other
incentives to convince another intervening country to have its experienced
soldiers assume the tasks of U.S. troops until indigenous elements are
more capable.
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